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INTERNATIONAL IMPACT REPORTS AND THE
CONSERVATION OF THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT
L. F. E. GOLDIE
In his testimony on the minimization of harmful environmental
effects of deep-sea mining, and the development of beneficial
by-products of such operations, before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House of Representatives Committee on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Dr. Oswald A. Roels' said: "Provided the [deep
sea] mining operation is conducted intelligently, then the discharged
deep sea mining effluent would not represent an environmental
2
hazard."
One way of assuring that the requisite intelligence which Dr. Roels
calls for is used in conducting deep-sea mining operations would be
the extension to international deep-sea mining activities of the
requirement, already existing in United States domestic legislation,
that agencies planning or proposing to permit environmentally
hazardous activities should compile, or call for, "impact reports."
These could be modelled, so far as this may be feasible, on the
"impact reports" or "impact statements" required by Section 102 of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).3
In order to ensure that the "presently unquantified environmental
values and amenities" will be given their "appropriate consideration," Section 102 (2)(C) of the Act enjoins upon the agency or
agencies taking major federal action with significant environmental
effects to have the "responsible official" prepare a detailed statement
(generally known as the "environmental report," the "environmental
statement," or the "impact report") containing detailed appraisals of:
*Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University College
of Law.
1. Dr. Roels is the Chairman of the Biological Oceanography Department at the
Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory and Professor at the City University Institute of
Oceanography.
2. Hearings on H.R. 13076, H.R. 13904, H.R. 14918, NACOA Authorization, H.R. 15280, and
Geneva U.N. Seabed Committee Before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 92-32, at 138 (1972) [hereinafter cited as "'Hearingson Oceanography
Miscellaneous']. See also Dr. Roels's written statement, id. at 123-36.
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§4321-47 (1970 [hereinafter
cited as NEPA.]. See also Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C.A. §§1151 notes,
1152, 1155, 1158, 1160-75 (1970) Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 104 (Supp. 1970). Guidelines
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act were issued by the Council on
Environmental Quality on April 23, 1971. See, Guidelines for Federal Agencies, under the
National Environmental Policy Act, 36 Fed.

Reg. 7724 (1971),

Reporter-Federal Laws 301 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "Guidelines"].
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(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
be involved in the proposed action should
resources which should
4
it be implemented.

Section 102 (2)(E) demands that, with respect to activities outside
the United States, this country's officials should:
recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of
the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperaa decline in the quality of
tion in anticipating and preventing
mankind's world environment. 5
In the light of this obligation, it can be argued that the interests of
the United States would be well served, especially from the point of
view of possible comparative mining costs, by requiring that the
activities of foreign mining enterprises be subject to approximately
equivalent environmental costs and controls as those envisaged by the
Congress for American enterprises in Section 102 (E). This would lead
to a rough equalization of opportunity. The proposal of this paper is,
accordingly, that the present bill before Congress entitled the Deep
Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 6 should include an environmental provision modelled on Sections 101 and 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act. In addition, the United States Draft for a
United Nations Convention on the International Seabed would have
been a more meaningful document if there had been less emphasis on
the elaboration of its institutional castles 7 and if, instead, the
draftsmen had included such specific environmental protection devices as the requirement of impact reports as part of the record on
which a decision to grant a license should be made.
4.
5.
6.
Sess.

42 U.S.C.A. §4332 (2)(C) (1970).
42 U.S.C.A. §4332 (2)(E) (1970).
H.R13904, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., S. 2801, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. Now H.R. 9, 93d Cong., 1st
(1973) [hereinafter cited as -H.R. 9"].

7. For a critical review of that draft's concentration of effort on the elaboration of
institutional structures rather than on functional proposals see Goldie, The United States Draft

for a United Nations Convention on the InternationalSeabed Area-A Polite Conversation, 65
Proceedings Am. Soc. Int'l L. 123 (1971).
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A DOMESTIC LAW ANALOGY-THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
AND "IMPACT REPORTS"

a. Legislative Policy
On January 1, 1970 NEPA became effective as law in the United
States. Its enactment reflected both the solicitude of special altruistic
interest groups anxious to preserve the beauties of North America and
a widespread concern among Congressmen and in the electorate
regarding the need to take significant and immediate steps in charging
upon the country's miracle of increasing productivity a due accountability for the "spillovers" or side effects of that productivity 8 which
are rapidly degrading the environment.
After asserting Congress' recognition of the "profound impact" of
modern society on "the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment," 9 Section 101 (b) of the Act 10 sets out the Congress'
environmental policy directives 1' to the federal government as
follows:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an
environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice;
8. See, e.g., Mishan, The Spillover Enemy, 33 Encounter 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Mishan]. See also Goldie, Amenities Rights-Parallels toPollution Taxes, 11 Natural Resources J.
274 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, Amenities Rights].
9. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, §101A, 42 U.S.C.A. §4331(a) (1970). See also
the statement of the purposes of the Act in §2, 42 U.S.C.A. §4321 (1970).

10. 42 U.S.C.A. §4331(b) (1970).
11. The drafting of the Act around duties to carry out affirmative "policy directives"
underscores the fine point made in E. Hanks and J. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The
Citizen Suit and the Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 230 (1970)
[herinafter cited as Hanks & Hanks], that "[i]n form the National Environmental Policy Act is
statute; in spirit a constitution." Id. at 245.
"Policy directives" are, of course, constitutional devices in the constitutions of the Republic of
India and of the Republic of Ireland. Their effectiveness may well come to depend on the
independence and vision of the judiciary. This dependence on the judiciary for the effectiveness
of policy directives has been well demonstrated in the United States in such cases as Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971) and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the
maximum attainable recyclling of depletable resources.
B. "Amenities Rights" and the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act
In a brief preliminary statement, this writer has suggested that a
combination of common law elaboration and legislative blueprints
(which purposely did not include the NEPA in the discussion)
might be viewed as foreshadowing the possible crystallization of
"amenities rights" in the domestic legal orders of at least some states
of the United States. 12 One question is whether the NEPA has
added a further consolidation in this process of development, and, if it
has done so, whether the Act's contribution has been through the
depositing of substantive rights out of procedural directives. Judge
13
Eisele has asserted that NEPA does not vest "substantive rights"'
On its face it merely prescribes
in individuals and organizations.
"procedural requirements.' 14 Note should be taken, however, of
Section 101(c) of the Act. 15 It provided that
The Congress recognizes each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsiblity to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
Thus, the issue of what stake individuals have in the Act is more
subtle than Judge Eisele's formulation would allow. For example, this
subsection has provided the basis for some federal courts to assert that
federal agencies have substantive duties under the Act, and especially
under Section 102.16 An example is to be found in the following
unequivocal formulation by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit: "We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA
mandates a particular sort of careful and informed decision making
17
process and creates enforceable duties."'
The phrase "enforceable duties" is clearly susceptible of an
overzealous emphasis; but it does not expressly require the recognition of substantive rights to be vested in individuals. On the other
hand, the requirements of its hard core meaning induce the expecta12. Goldie, Amenities Rights, supra note 8.
13. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §4331(c) (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §4332(1970)
17. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also id. at 1114.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

tion that courts will recognize individuals' "non-Hohfeldian"' 18 interests in requiring agencies to pay due regard to environmental
amenities when engaged in the development and application of their
policies, plans, and programs.
Be that as it may, the legislative history of the Act is significant on
this basic issue of whether Congress intended to create substantive
rights in amenities. The record shows that, while many members of
Congress expressed their apprehension that the act would create new
substantive rights of a dangerously disruptive and far-reaching
character, 19 its sponsors hastened to assure the fearful and the
suspicious that they had an entirely procedural enactment before
them.2 0 In the meantime, members of the public who are adversely
affected by federal policies have, in Professor Jaffe's terms, "non-Hohfeldian" legally protectable interests. In indicating the reference of
this term Professor Jaffe tells us:
It is not possible to formulate these interests in traditional
right-duty terms. But I would emphatically reject the conclusion
that because there can be no rights-no "legal injury" in the
traditional sense-we are driven to the opposite pole that there is
only a "public interest." Where the legislature has recognized a
certain"interest"as one which must be heeded, it is such a "legally
protected interest" as warrants standing to complain of its
disregard.2 1 (emphasis added)

There are four significant points to note regarding Professor Jaffe's
presentation of his "non-Hohfeldian interests":
1. Both his terminology and his thesis have been adopted by the
18. The qualifier "non-Hohfeldian" may be taken to indicate those interests which are not so
attached to an individual's legal persona that they must be viewed as uniquely his in the sense of
being a part of his total assets or "estate". Rather, they are res extra commercium which signal
no more than the claimant's capacity to vindicate social costs for which no individual can be
named the creditor. On the other hand, the non-Hohfeldian plaintiff must have some especial
footing to press his claim. This arises from the nexus which must necessarily exist between the
possible negation, or defeat, of expectations which the law has assured to him, and the relevant
activities of the person whose conduct has led, or may lead, to that defeat or negation.
19. Typical of such opposition was that of Congressman Harsha when he said: "I am still
concerned about the sweeping affect [sic] this legislation could have on the substantive
law .... ." 115 Cong. Rec. H. 40927 (1969). See also: Congressman Farbstein, id.
at 13096; Congressman Dingell, submitting the Conference Report on S. 1075 National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Report itself, id. at H. 40923.
20. See, for statements as to the policy directive and procedural qualities of the Act, by its
main sponsors, Senator Jackson id. at S. 40416, and id. at S. 40417; Senator Muskie id. at S.
40423 and S. 40923.
21. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 508 (1965); see also Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033

(1968).
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Supreme Court of the United States as far as the preliminary issue of
22
standing to sue in federal courts is concerned;
2. Professor Jaffe's formulation was offered some three and a half
years before the signing of NEPA into law on January 1, 1970,
and so he may have felt the need to be more tentative, at least with
respect to environmental issues, than he might be now-especially in
the light of Judge Wright's thesis in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee v. Atomic23 Energy Commission that the NEPA creates
"enforceable duties" which individuals and unincorporated entities
can pursue;
3. While "amenities rights" were not crystallized by NEPA, even
as interpreted by Judge Wright, the possible outline of their contours
may become contingently discernible, should the trend of legislation
and court decisions continue to amass legal materials for elucidation
and generalization in terms of such rights;
4. While interests begin their formulations in terms of non-Hohfeldian interests, they may ultimately come to be articulated in terms
of strict rights and their correlative duties-even when those duties
may appear as being owed on an objective basis in terms of social
values and policy.
Should Professor Jaffe feel impelled to reject this evolutionary
appraisal of the evanescent quality of the "interests" he ordains, then
he ought to own up to having mixed an over-rich cocktail of disparate
ingredients-having taken the analytical (and even compulsive) verbal
exactitude of Hohfeld, he combined it with the "objective" social
idealism of Duguit and the idealistic (and Hegelian) historicism of
Savigny. Such a mixture indicates, surely, an heroic recipe for a
nightmarel A more soberly pragmatic evolutionary stance would
appear to provide the easier and more credible explanation. The
suggestion is, therefore, that Professor Jaffe's "non-Hohfeldian interests" can crystallize into more conventionally conceived rights
and privileges when legislative developments (constituted, possibly,
by the accumulation of disparate enactments-all of which can be
related to aspects of an emerging common purpose), imaginative
judicial decision, and the clarifications by publicists responding to felt
social needs in a specific area, all combine to crystallize an emerging
22. See Association of Data Processing Services Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153-54 (1970). This was not affected by the more recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Sierra
Club v. Morton __

U.S. __

92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972), since in Morton the issue was simply

whether the Sierra Club could itself assert the non-Hohfeldian claims of its membership. The
negative reply to this question has not precluded the recognition of the Club's individual
members to assert their own non-Hohfeldian claims, see Mineral King Suit, 5 ERC 570 (1972).
23. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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rule of law. While it is under these auspicious circumstances that
substantive rights may begin as being "secreted in the interstices of
procedure" (to invoke Sir Henry Maine's great insight regarding the
emergence of substantive law in progressive legal systems), the
necessary political, economic and juridical conditions have not, as yet,
combined to mold presently-existing substantive rights to amenities
which individuals may vindicate in the decisional process of appropriate administrative agencies or before the regularly established
courts of law. Be the standing of substantive amenities rights in
domestric jurisprudence as it may, it is clearly premature to argue for
the recognition of such rights in public international law or even in
transnational legal relations.
C. Amenities and Impact Reports
Through NEPA the Congress directs all federal agencies to
"utilize a systematic interdisciplinary approach" to ensure the
"integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts" in their decision-making processes, 24 and to develop
methods and procedures so as to ensure that "presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values" will be given "appropriate
consideration" in their recommending, licensing, and other regulatory
deliberations. 25 These "presently unquantified environmental values"
are thus to take their place alongside "economic and technical
considerations" as determinative factors for administrators to consi26
der.
The basic requirements of Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA have
already been indicated. 2 7 These, and the foregoing discussion, pose at
least three topics for further discussion and development, especially
in the light of their transferability to the global arena as part of the
necessary reception of the hitherto domestic institution of impact
reports into international law. These topics, which constitute auxiliary legal concepts for the legal implementation of the obligation to
furnish impact reports are: (1) the significance of the term "appropriate consideration" in Section 102(2)(B) 28 as a guideline for
reviewable decisionmaking; (2) the problem of the outer limits of
relevance-both for the making of environmental reports and for
decision-making on the basis of such reports; and (3) the standards to
be applied in determining the protection of the "amenities."
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

§ 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). §4332(2)(A) (1970).
102(2)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. §4332(2)(B) (i970.
id.
See, supra, text accompanying note 4.
42 U.S.C.A. §4332(2)(B) (1970).
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1. Appropriate Consideration
The first question is whether "appropriate consideration" permits
an agency leeway in weighing the relevance of environmental policy
issues. In Calvert Cliffs"2 9 Judge Wright, for the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
The word "appropriate" in §102(2)(B) cannot be interpreted to
blunt the thrust of the whole Act or to give agencies broad
discretion to downplay environmental factors in their decisionmaking processes. The Act requiles consideration "appropriate"
to the problem of protecting our threatened environment, not
consideration "appropriate" to the whims, habits or other particular concerns of federal agencies. 0
The duties prescribed in Section 102 are not infinitely pliable.
They must be complied with to the fullest extent-unless they are
confronted by a clearly and directly contradictory statutory authority
in other legislation. Thus Section 104 provides that the environmental
duties already imposed by other
legislation does not eliminate any
"specific statutory obligations." 31 Only when such specific obligations
collide with national environmental policy requirements do the
agencies have any rationale for diluting their obligation to comply
with the "letter and spirit" of the statute. 32 This appraisal is
supported by the House conferees who reported that Section 10533
"does not obviate the requirement that the Federal agencies conduct
their activities in accordance with the provisions of this bill unless to
34
do so would clearly violate their existing statutory obligations."
Secondly, we may ask when does an agency have to be seized of
an environmental issue in its process of decision. Judge Wright in
Calvert Cliffs tells us that an agency may "not simply sit back, like an
umpire," 35 and resolve adversary contentions regarding environmental issues. "Rather, it must itself take the initiative of considerting
environmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of
the process .... ."36 Thus, in the case under discussion, Judge
Wright characterized the Atomic Energy Commission's willingness to
consider environmental issues within the hearing process only when
they might be raised by one of the parties, and not otherwise, as a
29. 449 F.2d 1109, 1113, n. 8. (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. Id. at 1113, n. 8.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §4334 (1970).
32. 449 F.2d 1109, 1115, n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §4335 (1970).
34. Conference Report on S. 1075, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., Ser. 115, pt. 29, at 39, 703 (1969).
35. 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. Id.
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"crabbed interpretation- 37 of NEPA. Federal agencies have an
affirmative duty of developing the environmental aspects of the
record before them on their own initiatives, and of rendering their
decisions in terms of all the factors (including the environmental ones)
contained in such records.
Third, Federal agencies may not resign their affirmative tasks by
accepting the standards set by the states or by other Federal agencies.
They are required to apply the National Environmental Policy Act in
all cases which fall short of the statutory confrontation Section 104
envisages. As to water quality standards in particular, Section 104
does bring into play consideration of the Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970.38 This does not, however, call for the displacement of
NEPA standards since other "specific statutory obligations" are not
intended to replace NEPA entirely. That formula ensures, rather, that
the Act will not negate the following obligations: (a) that of
complying with standards set under the Water Quality Improvement
Act and of not nullifying those standards; (b) that of coordinating with
or consulting agencies charged with the maintenance and improvement of water quality standards; and (c) that of acting, or refraining
from acting, "contingent upon" a certification under the Water
Quality Improvement Act. (This Act makes an agency's granting of a
license "contingent upon a water quality certification." But "it does
not require" the agency "to grant a license once a certification has
been issued." 39 ) The agency should thus act upon an environmental
report which assesses adverse environmental effects of any proposed
40
action and discusses possible alternatives to the proposed action.
Fourth, in conclusion, Calvert Cliffs tells us that a Federal agency is
under an obligation to inform itself through impact reports of
environmental problems of any contemplated action and then take
independent action, if necessary, to make its decision in the light of
such reports as part of the record before it and upon which its
decision is based.
2. "DetailedStatement"-An Obligationof Full Disclosure
In Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Engineers41 Judge
Parker indicated the duty of the Federal Government to work on the
37. Id. at 1117.
38. 33 U.S.C.A. §§1151, 1152, 1156, 1158, 1160-75 (1970).
39. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109,
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1971). (J. Wright's emphasis).
40. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
41. 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
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basis of a detailed and systematic impact statement in the following
terms:
The [NEPA] recognizes a "continuing responsibility of the
Federal Government" to strive to preserve and enhance the
environment, and requires a detailed and systematic
consideration
42
of the environmental impact of Federal actions.
The Act's call for a detailed statement has been viewed as setting a
standard with which agencies must comply and on the basis of which
courts will review the degree of detail of any environmental
statement, Secondly, the courts do not hold the provision as merely
calling for a statement oriented from the project's point of view, but
as demanding an environmental investigation conducted in terms of
objective and thorough research. Thus in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Hardin4 3 Judge Gasch outlined the policy of the relevant
provision. He said:
This section makes the completion of an adequate research
program a prerequisite to agency action. The adequacy of the
research should be judged in light of the scope of the proposed
program and the extent to which existing knowledge raises the
possiblity of potential adverse environmental effects. The Act
envisions that program formulation will be directed by research
results rather than that research programs will be designed to
substantiate programs already decided upon. Thus, this provision
of the Act requires a diligent research effort, undertaken in good
faith, which utilizes effective methods and 44
reflects the current
state of the art of relevent scientific discipline.
And he specifically defined the statutory criterion of "detailed
statement" as follows:
The statement must be sufficiently detailed to allow a responsible
executive to arrive at a reasonably accurate decision regarding the
environmental benefits and detriments to be expected from
program implementation. The statement should contain adequate
discussion of alternative proposals to allow for program modifiation during agency review so that the results to be achieved will
be in accordance with national environmental goals. 45
In a similar vein Judge Eisele, in Environmental Defense Fund Inc.
v. Corps of Engineers,46 gave the Act the very interesting characteri42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 881.
325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
Id. at 1403.
Id. at 1403-04.
325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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zation of an "environmental full disclosure law" 47 and added,
speaking of Section 102's requirements:
The Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the
then existing decision-making responsibilities or to take away any
then existing freedom of decision-making, but it certainly intended to make such decision-making more responsive and more
responsible.
The "detailed statement" required by Section 102(2)(C) should, at
minimum, contain such information as will alert the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality, the public, and, indeed, the
Congress to all known possible environmental consequences of
proposed agency action. Where experts, or concerned public or
private organizations, or even ordinary lay citizens, bring to the
attention of the responsible agency environmental impacts which
they contend will result from the proposed agency action, then
the Section 102 statement should set forth these contentions and
opinions, even if the responsible agency finds no merit in them
whatsoever. Of course, the Section 102 statement can and should
also contain the opinion of the responsible agency with respect to
all such viewpoints. The record should be complete. Then, if the
such factors they will be doing so
decisionmakers choose to ignore
48
with their eyes wide open.
3. The Outer Limits of Relevance
We are being taught inexorably and perhaps with brutal inevitability how the environment is a seamless web and how our burgeoning
gross national product continuously sets in motion deleterious chain
reactions which appear to be without end. On the other hand, the
law, to make decisions manageable, must cut the causal chain;
otherwise the search for the complete content of an agency's
environmental statement could be an unceasing quest. While the Act
does not set forth the outer boundaries of a statements's intended
scope, limits must be read into it by a reasonable construction of
NEPA. Although no formal or abstract limitation can be set to the
number of links of causation, nor ought the imposition of such
misleading criteria as "direct and indirect" be attempted, relevance,
as a test which combines the degree of knowledge with the
foreseeability of specific environmental degradation, should not be
beyond the ingenuity of legislative draftsmen to formulate or judges to
apply.
"Relevance" in this context could be illustrated by distinguishing a
Federal Housing Authority considering the granting of loans for
47. Id. at 759.
48. Id.

April 1973]

INTERNA TIONA L IMPA CT REPOR TS

houses in a development whose area had been cleared through the
chopping down of uniquely valuable trees from that Authority
undertaking to review whether it should continue to support financially the current American demand for single-home ownership, since
such a method of providing shelter calls for construction methods
which create an inevitable demand for vast amounts of lumber. That
is, should it support social values which lead to large-scale deforestation when alternative methods of providing comfortable, hygienic,
and aesthetically pleasing housing which would use far less lumber
could be availed of? Whereas the former would necessarily fall within
the scope of an environmental report, the latter would clearly involve
issues beyond the assumptions underlying FHA's functions, and
beyond the scope of its environmental investigations under the Act.
In the process of agency decision making, other relevant factors in
addition to environmental ones, namely scientific, engineering, social
need and economic advantage, are all brought to bear. While each set
of factors dictates its own requirements in terms of the agency's
overall goals, it cannot impose a monolithic guide to decision. Impact
or environmental reports follow a similar pattern of appraisal,
modification, and partial displacement as do the other factors to be
taken into consideration on the record. This acknowledgment,
however, does not negate the crucial role such reports play in the flow
of administrative decisions which the law now requires to be guided
towards the betterment of society and its total environment.
4. The Standards
The Guidelines49 which the Council on Environmental Quality
promulgated on April 23, 1971, set the affected agencies the concrete
task of individually providing specific standards to govern the conduct
which fell within the scope of the authority each enjoyed. My
proposal here is merely to indicate some ot the values underpinning
those standards.
Capitalist and socialist societies alike assume that human welfare
advances by transforming the raw materials of the universe into the
means of production and consumer goods. Generally speaking, neither
type of society has come to accept the harsh fact of life that this
process of converting "nature" into "goods" has its own costs, indeed
its own dangers, to human welfare. That this could be the case is the
perception of only a small minority in the most advanced societies.
Amongst the vast majority of humanity such a position is still greeted
with skepticism, or even as the enunciation of a cruel joke. Peoples
who do not enjoy the cornucopia of a high gross national product and
49. See, Guidelines,supra note 3.
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its concomitant of a high level of spillover pollution tend to view the
concern of industrialized societies for environmental matters as a
hypocritical sophistry for preventing the full economic development
of the underdeveloped areas of the world. In the industrial states, this
concern is often seen as a confidence trick to undermine our
traditional trust in technological virtuosity and managerial competence. Despite the lag in public opinion, however, the development of
safeguards against harmful side effects resulting from the transformation of "nature" into "property," and the formulation of the
modalities of liability for the harms those transformations bring in
their train, are becoming urgent tasks for lawyers. It is thus becoming
increasingly imperative to define independent environmental base
values for free enterprise and socialist societies which can be built
into contemporary exploitative consumer values. One such base value
is to ensure that the amenities of the community are not threatened,
even though they may be transformed, while consumer goods raise
living standards.
IMPACT REPORTS AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RECOGNIZED BY
CIVILIZED NATIONS
A. The Doctrinal Underpinningsof Impact Reports
1. "Legal Doctrines"-A Stipulated Definition
Legal doctrines (for example, the doctrines of part performance,
undue influence and estoppel) are bodies of principles and rules
collected together, and arranged in terms of a defining legal concept;
and reflect a basic social value-for example, respectively, mutuality,
dependence, and the reliance of the weaker or more vulnerable parties on the protections equity can provide. By virtue of their complexity and comprehensiveness, legal doctrines, while distinguished from
legal rules, standards, principles and concepts, are shaped out of
them. In structuring the relations of their component rules, principles
and standards, the concepts which legal doctrines crystallize articulate social claims for justice. The deeply felt social values to which
they give expression have a double function: First, that of clarification
and an increasingly specific formulation out of the welter of sentiments and ideas (both articulate and inarticulate) at large in the
society of the time and place of their emergence; and, Second, the
reception of those ideals of justice into the formal legal order. This
process of the crystallization of rules and principles around a
definitive idea (the concept) identifies the doctrine's provenance as a
claim of justice at large in society which comes to be received into
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the law as it is rendered capable of expression in specific and
technical legal terms. The process of the reception of a general notion
of justice into the practical formulations of the law is a function of its
clarification and implementation. The reception of emerging ideas of
justice into a legal order is a dispository act by designated personnel,
for example legislators or judges, and so it is to be distinguished from
clarification and emergence. These operate anteriorly and as part of
the processes of society at large.
Briefly, legal doctrines come into being through the following
process: A developing and relatively specific articulation of the notion
of justice comes to involve claims that create a demand for its legal
implementation; new rules and doctrines are then forged, or old ones
gathered together around that notion-thereby creating the modalities
of the idea's reception into law. Then those rules and doctrines
themselves become grouped around the central idea of justice as it
becomes clarified in the law's process of claim, counterclaim and
accomodation. The idea of justice then emerges both as the defining
concept governing those principles and rules forming the doctrine and
the determinant of the mode of their interrelated grouping, as it were
in a constellation, around it. The central and defining idea or legal
concept groups and arranges the rules and principles. This illustrates
how reception is also a part of the clarification process of society, just
as judges are part of society. It also illustrates the separateness of the
dispository function of reception from the creative functions in
society of emergence and clarification.
2. Legal Doctrinesand Legislation
Legal doctrines have, in the main, been developed by courts in a
process of applying a given basic value through rules and principles
chosen for the task, of testing and reviewing results, and of reformulation of the defining concept. Legislatures have also, if only infrequently, been the sources of legal doctrines-for example, in the area
of "no fault" automobile insurance and Workmen's Compensation
laws. But there is no reason why a carefully drawn statute should not
equally fulfill the legal and societal conditions of constituting a legal
doctrine as does one which comes into being through judicial
formulation. Indeed, the conservative suspicion lawyers entertain of
legislation as a source of law, and their professional resistance to
examining the policy aspects of a statute in the same spirit as they do
that of case law, may help to explain why, in the present age of
widespread legislative reform, so few legal doctrines with a legislative
provenance have been recognized as appropriate sources of international law.
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Be that as it may, Section 102 of NEPA satisfies the criteria for a
legal doctrine. It embodies the reception and legal expression of a
deeply held value at large in modern society. Around the central legal
concept of full disclosure there is a cluster of rules and standards.
Subordinate to the Act, and in order to implement it the Executive
has promulgated guidelines for making the requisite full disclosures.
3. Environmental Legislationas Legal Doctrine
The doctrinal roots of the legal principles and rules clustered
around impact reports are, therefore: (1) the social demand for
environmental protection which is reflected in the building of
environmental costs into the process of manufacture, and the use of
impact reports to ensure that society will not be called upon to bear
an undertaking's environmental costs; (2) the defining of the obligations the statute imposes on an enterprise to make full disclosures of
possible environmental degradations attendant on the establishment
of a proposed undertaking or installation; and (3) the duties of
administrators to take impact reports fully into account when
licensing a projected undertaking. These are the defining concepts
around which the specific rules set out in the legislation and
guidelines are arranged, not in black and white formulation of Section
102, but in its operation in the process of decision. Impact reports
may thus be seen as the institutional representation of the basic legal
concept of the legal doctrine contained in Section 102 of NEPA,
namely the doctrine requiring economic enterprises to minimize their
environmental degradations, to carry the costs of their environmental
alterations, and to make a full disclosure of their impact on the
environment. This doctrine (and its institutional expression-the
impact report) is capable of universal application through legislation
in domestic systems and internationally through agreements and
through the settlement of disputes by arbitration or conciliation.
B. Adaptability of Impact Reports for International Reception: An
Appraisal
1. The Concept of "Impact Reports"
While it is true that when an agency acts upon a record it must take
into account matters other than environmental factors, the part of
the record which deals with environmenal issues must be given full
consideration. The environmental factors are not merely to be
perfunctorily formulated as part of the record, nor as the result of the
assiduity of private groups, nor because contending parties at a
hearing have invoked them. The agency itself has a duty to develop
them and build them into its record. This is done by the preparation
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of the report by the agency which then focuses attention on the
environmental factors relevant to the decision-makers' considerations.
For example, in Amchitka5 0 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia tells us that the functions of impact reports
include such considerations as the following:
Moreover, the statement has significance in focusing environmental factors for informed appraisal by the President, who has broad
concern even when not directly involved in the
decisional process,
51
and in any event by Congress and the public.
As a device which should provide an important input in the
appraisal of a proposal, plan or application, an impact report has a
number of facets. These include:
1. Its informational and fact-collecting function;
2. Its evidential value of the thoroughness of the agency's good
faith environmental investigations;
3. Its role in ensuring that environmental factors, as embodied in
an essential part of the record, are duly considered by the agency in
reaching its conclusion;
4. Its utility for purposes of review and reconsideration at all
levels, including, in appropriate circumstances, review by the President or the Congress;
5. Its significance in giving standing before the federal courts to
individuals and private groups who wish to bring agency decisions
before the courts for judicial review on the basis of claims that either
constitutional (and especially due process) or statutory (for example
environmental policy, water quality, or pure air) "interests" 52 have
not been adequately considered by the relevant agency (or agencies);
and
6. Its evolving importance in crystallizing the notion of "interests"
procedurally sufficient to given parties "standing" before the courts,
into substantive rights to life in terms of the amenities which make
such a right viable, meaningful and practical.
2. Adapting Impact Reports to an International Regime Governing
Deep-Sea Mining Activities
(a) Environmental Problems of Deep-Sea Mining
The International Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3, proclaims a "right to life" for all individual human beings. 53 This right
50. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1126 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 1128.
52. For the connotation and significance of Professor Jaffe's development of the term
"interests" in the context of "standing" see, supra notes 18-21 and the accompanying text.
53. 3 U.N.G.A.O.R. 1, 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 6. 1, Annex to G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), text in 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 861, 863
(1967).
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may develop ancillary claims for environmental protection and even
enhancement. For a right to life is meaningless if it guarantees a
meagre existence assuring no more than a brutish survival. Accordingly, claims for the protection, and even the enhancement, of
amenities may be viewed as emerging as matters of international
concern in specific arenas of international action. Among these,
necessarily, is deep-sea mining with its possibilities of pollution
damage to the world's oceans. Deep-sea mining can be classified into
a number of subdivisions. Those offered here are: (i) the winning of
fossil fuels under the seabed; and (ii) the capturing of surficial
deposits, especially nodules from the seabed of the deep oceans. The
winning of minerals in suspension in seawater will be barely touched
on here, since, for the time being at any rate, it will offer little to a
discussion of the relevance of impact reports to international mining
regimes.
(i) Winning Fossil Fuels Under the Seabed
For a considerable time oil has been taken from shallow seabed
areas. But recent improvements in technology have allowed economically feasible oil drilling to take place beyond the 200 meter
bathymetric contour line. 54 (The outer limit of the legal continental
56
shelf as defined in terms of an isobath.) 55 This technological trend
57
will become intensified as demand increases. Thus, Our Nation and
the Sea tells us:
54. See, Goldie, The Exploitability Test-Interpretations and Potentialities, 8 Natural
Resources J. 434-36 (1968), especially note the accompanying text and Appendix I for an outline
of this trend off the coasts of the United States.
55. See, Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
56. Experimental drillings have already been conducted through over 11,000 feet of water
into sediment beneath. See, e.g., the report of Glomar Challenger's drilling through 11,720 feet
of water and a further 472 feet of sediment in the Gulf of Mexico to discover oil in submarine
salt domes, New York Times, Sept. 24, 1968, at 44, cols. 2-5. This report indicated that the depth
of 17,567 feet was also drilled. See also id. Sept. 1, 1968, at 45, cols. 3-7, and Nov. 26, 1968, at 28,
cols. 2-7. For a report of discoveries by the U.S, Navy Ship Kane of clues to "oil rich salt domes"
in the deep ocean off the west coast of Africa see New York Times, May 13, 1969, at 29, cols. 1-5.
For reports on oil exploration plays on the continental shelf and slopes of the United States and
Canadian Atlantic coasts, see New York Times, Aug. 30, 1968, at 25, cols. 6-7. This article
reported that: (1) permits have been issued for the exploration of 260 million acres ar nearly
410,000 square miles of seabed; (2) the Shell Oil Company will use a semi-submersible rig, the
Sedco H. which will drill as deep as 25,000 feet while sitting on the seabed under 1,000 feet of
water, or afloat through 800 feet of water; (3) most of the areas now being explored are within
200 miles of the largest cities of the United States (other areas are close to major Canadian
cities); and that (4) most of this area is extremely turbulent like the North Sea and in their
weather and climatic conditions contrasts with the Gulf of Mexico and Southern California
coasts. Taken together, these factors greatly increase the dangers of major oil catastrophes near
great population centers.
57. See, Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea
122-30 (1969), [hereinafter cited as Our Nation and the Sea], for a projection in both demand for
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Twenty-two countries now produce or are about to produce oil
and gas from offshore sources. Investments of the domestic
offshore oil industry, now running more than $1 billion annually,
are expected to grow an average of nearly 18 per cent per year
over the coming decade. Current free world offshore oil production is about 5 million barrels per day, or about 16 per cent of the
free world's total output.5 8
As the ability to develop more offshore oil and gas resources from
deeper and deeper regions, the increasing technological virtuosity
will inevitably give rise to more acute problems of polluting the seas
and the coasts.
The reports in the New York Times, between January 31 and April
3, 1969, of the events which constituted the sorry history of the oil
drilling catastrophe in the Santa Barbara Channel, should indicate to
thoughtful people the pressing need to take immediate measures for
the protection of our environment against the time when powerful
enterprises will be engaging in massive and widespread deep-ocean
submarine oil drilling exploitations. As exploration and exploitation
activities extend further into the deep oceans, so must the risk of
blow-outs increase-with the consequent difficulty of getting them
under control if rigorous conditions and regulations are not imposed.
In addition, the requirement of absolute liability59 has a necessary
place here, just as with regard to the obligations of the operators of
giant tankers and the sub-ocean trains and pipelines. With the
possibility of blow-out wells in the deep oceans and damaged or
deteriorated pipelines discharging their polluting contents into the
ocean environment, absolute liability should be imposed for harms
done. These possibilities also point to the risk of great harms to the
environment, and to those who look to the sea for their survival,
livelihood, health, therapy and recreation. Furthermore, as new uses
of the sea develop (e.g., undersea hospitals, laboratories, holiday
centers and store houses), so will the exposure to harm increase.
More injurious to the environment than dramatic blowouts such as
that of Santa Barbara, and more recently that in the Gulf of Mexico,
or even massive oil spills from giant tankers (e.g., Torrey Canyon), are
and production of offshore oil "twenty years from now." In addition to Our Nation and the Sea
the Commission published 3 volumes of Panel Reports: 1. Science and the Environment (1969);
2. Industry and Technology: Keys to Ocean Development (1969); 3. Marine Resources and Legal
Political Arrangements for Their Development (1969) [hereinafter cited as Panel Reports and
prefixed by the appropriate volume number].
58. Our Nation and the Sea, id. at 122.
59. See Goldie, Liabilityfor Damage and the Progressive Development of InternationalLaw,
14 Int'l & Comparative L.Q. 1189, 1215-20, 1241-44, 1246-49 (1965); Goldie, International
Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 283, 309-12 (1970), for a
revival of the term "absolute liability" with a new content and operation.
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the day-to-day minor spills and leaks of oil from a multitude of
activities. The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and
Resources has said:
• . .[T]he most pervasive pollution comes not from headlined oil
spills but from the many activities which take place every day
underwater. There are about 16,000 oil wells off the continental
United States, and the number is increasing by more than one
thousand a year. There is rightful concern that oil well blowouts,
leaks in pipelines, and storm damage can cause pollution that
could ruin large part of commercial fisheries, sportsfishing, and
60
recreational areas.

(ii) Surficial Deposits
Writing some nine years ago, Dr. John Mero could claim:
. . . [S]ubstantial engineering data and calculations show that it
would be profitable to mine from the sea materials such as
phosphates, nickel, copper, cobalt and even manganese at today's
(1964) costs and prices. And I firmly believe that within the next
generation, the sea will be a major source of, not only those
metals, but of molybdenum, vanadium, lead, zinc, titanium,
aluminum, zirconium and several other metals as well.
• . . But most important, the sea-floor nodules should prove to be
and
less expensive sources of manganese, nickel, cobalt,6 copper
1
possibly other metals than our present land resources.
While these minerals may be won increasingly from the sea, they
undergo a cycle of constant renewal 62 which, for the foreseeable
future, will continue to add a greater quantity of nodules to the store
already on the seabed than could be taken for human use. This
possible future source of wealth and well-being however, like the
winning of oil and gas from the subsoil of the deep oceans, carries
risks of polluting the environment. The Commission on Marine
Science, Engineering and Resources explains:
Mining operations conducted completely independent of land (as
in the deep sea or remote shallow banks) will result in entirely
different processing and transportation problems. Ore will be
loaded directly in barges, tankers, or ore transports. Immediate
60. 1 Panel Reports (III) 52-53.
61. Mero, Mineral Resources of the Sea 275, 280 (1965). See also Mero, Review of Mineral
Values on and under the Ocean Floor, Exploiting the Ocean 61 (Transactions of the Second
Annual Marine Technology Society Conference and Exhibit, Washington, June 27-29, 1966)
[hereinafter cited as Mero, Mineral Values]; 1 Panel Reports (1) 32; 3 Panel Reports (VII)
106-07; Troebst, Conquest of the Sea 180-93 (1962).
62. See, e.g., Mero, Mineral Values, at 76.
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initial beneficiation or processing may be necessary at sea to

reduce weight or bulk although this may require large processing
equipment on the dredging ship. If all operations are conducted
from a single vessel, this will further reduce the amount of ore
collected on each trip. If multiple vessel operations are anticipated, one collecting and processing vessel could operate continuously while transport vessels shuttle to port. 63
What this does not tell us is that the waste products, including acids
and other processing chemicals, will be dumped into the sea by the
mobile processing ship. 64 A number of such ships could turn sea areas
(perhaps of no great extent initially) into maritime equivalents of slag
heaps, causing considerable ecological change and deleteriously
affecting the food web. Should spillover and waste disposal problems
emerge from the winning of minerals in suspension in seawater, they
would probably resemble greatly those connected with the beneficiation or processing at sea of hard minerals dredged from the seabed.
On the other hand, it must be emphasized this is not a necessary
consequence of deep-sea mining. But it may be a possible consequence of an unintelligent 65 approach to the utilization of the hard
mineral resources of the deep ocean. If the methods and techniques
that were used took into account the need for ecological concern,
then deepsea mining could be a means of positively enhancing the
66
environment by means of stimulating biological productivity.
(b) Some Specific Problems of Adaptation- Unique Issues for a
Deep-Sea Mining Regime
Apart from a few facts about possible geological structures
(including those containing oil) and the existence of nodules, we know
next to nothing of the deep-ocean bed and the continental slopes and
margins. The creation of an international law duty to prepare the
type of environmental report which NEPA calls for within the
domestic United States would give a strong impulsion to the
improvement of that knowledge. Secondly, if a state or an international agency were called upon to take such a report into considera63. See 2 Panel Reports (VI) 186; see also id. at (V) 184-85.
64. But see 2 Panel Reports (VI) 188 where the following recommendation was made:
Research on the problem of waste disposal ....
[U]nwise dumping of the
tailings, if not carefully planned, could quickly foul a mining operation.
Furthermore, the compatability of a marine mining operation with exploitation of
the other resources of the sea, particularly the food resources, will depend
principally on the effectiveness of the tailings-disposal system.
65. See the quotation from Dr. Roels's testimony on May 12, 1972 Before the Subcommittee
on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,supra note 2 and
the accompanying text.
66. See testimony of Dr. Roels, Hearings on Oceanography Miscellaneous, supra note 2, at
138.
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tion when deciding whether or not to grant an exploration or exploitation mining lease or license, there would be an available record testifying to the weight the responsible decision-maker accorded
to essential environmental factors. Should these be neglected or
undervalued, such a failure would be apparent on review or in the
event of subsequent claims being made by injured persons. Thirdly, in
the event of a decision to grant the application, a comprehensively
drafted impact statement could guide the state or agency as to the
conditions it should impose in consideration for granting a license,
and point to the safe prospecting and mining methods and procedures
which should be imposed in order to diminish the possiblity of either
the slow development of slag heaps in the ocean or dramatic
catastrophes. Fourthly, an impact report should be able to provide all
interested parties (the international administering agency, states,
consortia, international public enterprises, private and public enterprises and individuals) useful guidance in pinpointing responsibility in
the event, post hoc, of pollution occurring, or becoming detected.
Fifthly, even at the international level, an impact report could
operate to inform the interested and effective constituencies within
each state as to the responsibility, or irresponsibility, of its
government, and the enterprises its government licenses or espouses,
towards the global environment. These reports would thus not only
provide instruments whereby the regime could forestall or control
polluting activities beyond the limits of state jurisdiction, but also
quickly provide guidance for the fixing of accountability for damage
from pollution.
(c) The Universality of Impact Reports
Impact reports are not specifically and idiosyncratically relevant
only to federal legal order in the United States. They are the
institutionalization of legal doctrines capable of universal adaptation.
Within each nation state, legislatures could introduce those reports
into their own administrative practices. Internationally, they could be
included in arrangements for the supranational or even the international control of pollution. The rules, institutions and concepts which
are included within the doctrine (which requires enterprises to
shoulder the costs of the changes which they make to the environment
and to make a full disclosure of the possible consequences of their
plans-insofar as the state of the art permits) have an important
function applicable in all economies which are guided by policies of
attaining (or of increasing) high levels of productivity. The singleminded pursuit of such goals brings about the undesirable spillover
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effects attendant upon a disregard of the environment and the passing
onto it of the social costs of technological virtuosity. Confronted by
the dialectic of values calling for high productivity at minimal cost
and those insisting on environmental integrity, decision-makers cannot avoid hard choices and adjustments. These choices and adjustments can be better informed and buttressed when environmental
statements or reports become an institutionalized part of economic
planning. This could be especially true of proposed international
regimes to govern deep-sea mining activities.
NEPA provides an example of a statute which, although enacted
to meet a specific need local to the environment of the United States
and drafted in terms of the technicalities of federal legislation, reflects
also an increasingly universal solicitude for our global habitat. In this
sense the Act provides other states with an example of how concern to
develop legal machinery capable of effective environmental protection can be translated into legislation. It also offers useful and
adaptable legal doctrines and institutions to the framers of universal
and regional conventions on the intelligent management of activities
which could be environmentally deleterious.
The Act's legislative history includes a unique document, namely
the Joint Senate House Colloquium on the Environment entitled
Congressional White Paper and A National Policy on the Environment.67 This points clearly to the perplexity of feeling compelled to
choose between productivity and environmental preservation. It also
sought the legal means of passing safely between the horns of this
dilemma. It set out, in the following terms, what were later to be the
basic policies of the Act:
If America is to create a carefully designed, healthful, and
balanced environment, we must (1) find equitable ways of
charging for environment abuses within the traditional free-market economy; (2) obtain adequate ecological guidance on the
character and impact of environmental change; (3) where corporate resource development does not preserve environmental
values, then consider the extension of governmental controls in
the larger public interest; (4) coordinate the Government agency
activities, which share with industry the dominant influence in
shaping our environment; and (5) establish judicial procedures so
that the individual rights to a productive and high-quality
environment can be assured. 68
67. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and House Committee on Science and
Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Congressional White Paper on a National Policy For The
Environment (1968).
68. Id. at 2.
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C. "General Principlesof Law"
Although the legislation of a single state cannot validly be viewed
as a "source," 69 under Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, one may argue that domestic law developments can
provide important analogies for evolving international law. But this is
a position which stems from the traditional positivistic dichotomy
between lex ferenda and lex lata. Indeed, municipal legislation suffers
in comparison with the writings of publicists and the decisions of
domestic tribunals-since these latter are specifically named as
sources (albeit "subsidiary" sources) of international law in aleana d.
It is, furthermore, unusual to see specific acts of legislation (as distinct
from the general provisions of codes which may be viewed as merely
the legislative restatements of "common law" in its widest sense)
providing the domestic analogies contemplated in Article 38.1.c., i.e.,
"the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." This
phenomenon is to be contrasted with the hospitable reception by
international lawyers of "common law" doctrines developed by
domestic courts and publicists. 70 While the famous Lex Aquilia71 may
appear to have been accorded a similar reception by international
lawyers-for example the reception of its offshoot doctrine of lucrum
cessans in the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow 72-its attraction lay, not so much in the original plebiscitum 73 of the Roman
people, as in the general principles, interpretations, analogies, and
extensions which had come to cover it in layer after layer of ideas
accumulated for over two thousand years of doctrinal exposition.74
The rationale of international lawyers' restraint in drawing upon
legislative enactments (other than codifications of "common law")
stems from statutes' specificity and limited scope. By contrast with
legislation, those municipal law rules which are most apt to provide
the materials of general principles of law are, when stripped of their
national peculiarities and technical elaborations, capable of a general,
if not a universal, synthesis. In this way legal principles which are
common to, underpin and explain, specific domestic law doctrines,
69. On the meaning of the term "source of law" see, e.g., 1 Oppenheim, International Law
24-25 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
70. See, e.g., the use of equity by Judge Hudson, Diversion of the Waters from the River
Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J. ser. A/B No. 70, at 76-79, and the relevance of equitable reliance in
connection with the "Ihlen Declaration" in the Status of Eastern Greenland Case, [1933]
P.C.I.J. ser. A/B No. 53, at 69-73.
71. Institutes 4.3; Lawson, Negligence In Civil Law 80-137 (1950); Lafontaine, Pasicrisie
Intemationale 364; Lauterpacht, The Function Of Law In the International Community 117-18
(1933).
72. [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 9, at 21.
73. See Jolowicz, Historical Introduction To Roman Law 289 (1932).
74. On the reception of the Lex Aquilia in international law see, generally, 3 Whiteman,
Damages In International Law 1838-391 (1943).
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provide international lawyers with the greater part of the materials of
decision and of legal development under aleanac. of Article 38.1
As domestic legislative activity increases in both significance and
volume as a means of both law reform and the expression of
fundamental social values within states, so the traditional objections
to the reception of statute law as a source of general principles of law
should become obsolete. The fact that they have not done so testifies
to the almost intransigent conservatism of the legal profession in
matters of method. Outstanding among the legislative expressions of
social policy which should overcome that conservatism of lawyers are
the environmental concerns NEPA has enacted into law. These,
standing out as the legislative formulation of legal doctrines, 75 are
available for their universalization by treaties and by international
diplomacy.
THE UNITED STATES'
MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION
An initial step in implementing the proposal made in the foregoing
could be to incorporate a provision in H.R. 976 calling for impact
reports to be made as a condition precedent to the granting of a
license. Such impact reports should assure compliance with the kind
of standards which Dr. Roels has foreshadowed in his written
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Oceanography. 77 These
provisions would add no increased burdens to those already available
in Section 102(2)(E) of the NEPA for the regulation of American
industry. On the other hand, their incorporation into H.R. 9, together
with the requirement that the bill's reciprocity provisions should
extend to the impact report requirements would tend to equalize the
otherwise disadvantageous position of American industry, as well as to
operate positively to protect the environment. As, potentially, a major
importer of the seabed's hard minerals won by foreign enterprises, or
of goods made therefrom, the United States could effectively exercise
a significant leverage on other nations such as the Federal Republic of
Germany and Japan (who are also developing their deepsea mining
capabilities) and so ensure that their enterprises, too, act "intelligently", in Dr. Roels's sense, 78 with respect to their responsibilities
towards the environmental protection of the ocean. Such a provision
would stress to the World Community that the United States is using
H.R. 9 as the first vehicle for a pragmatic and working rule of
environmental protection.
75. See, supra.
76. Supra note 6.
77. See, Hearingson Oceanography Miscellaneous, supra note 2, at 124-28.
78. See quotation, supra, accompanying footnote 2.
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In addition, provisions implementing the administrative use of
impact reports should be incorporated in all United States drafts for
regimes governing seabed resources as one of a battery of means for
environmental protection. It is to be equally regretted that the
various proposals submitted to the Seabeds Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly 7 9 and those contained in the Report of the
President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and
Resources8 0 have not, generally, offered concrete proposals for
combatting the pollution effects of deepsea mining let alone made
any such specific proposal as that contained in these pages.
CONCLUSION
Although this paper has focussed upon the one issue of advocating
the inclusion of impact reports in H.R. 9 and other United States
proposals for a regime governing the resources of the deep ocean
floor, it is acknowledged that these are but one important means, in a
whole array, of environmental protection. On the other hand, such
environment impact reports can provide important legal and political
controls over activities and, as such, should be recognized as
important and powerful devices when used in a coordinated manner
with other means of accountability. The stress on impact reports in
this paper has arisen from a felt need to stress one issue strongly,
rather than lose needed emphasis by writing discursively in terms of
all the possible instruments for creating an effective global environmental policy with which impact reports can be combined.
Other possible cognate means of achieving a degree, at least, of
management of the effects on the environment of deepsea mining
activities include the installation of monitoring systems, the development of procedures for scientifically measuring marine pollution, the
establishment of regulatory regimes, and the carefully discriminating
recognition of emerging claims for protecting amenities. Information
supplied in impact reports could promote the effectiveness of
amenities rights by contributing to their concrete formulation,
especially in cases where that information is available in terms of the
environmental scientific measuring and environmental monitoring
systems which could well go hand in hand with the transnational and
international institutionalization of impact reports. Taken together,
all these devices could contribute to giving more precise definitions to
79. For a collection of the draft treaties and proposals submitted to the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the
United Nations General Assembly see United Nations Secretariat, Comparative Table of Draft
Treaties, Working Papers and Draft Articles, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/L.10 (mimeo) (Jan. 28, 1972).
80. See, Our Nation and The Sea at 147-51.
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the criteria of environmental protection an agency or an enterprise
should be held to.
In proposing the reception of impact reports into international
seabed regimes, this article participates in the continuing search for
institutions and concepts which can build into contemporary consumer-oriented business activities (shared alike by socialist and
private enterprise economies) the means of vindicating environmental
values. It has, further, sought to indicate both the institutional means
for giving effect to those environmental values in concrete form, and
the vehicles (for example H.R. 9) of the proposed institutional means.
Finally, the foregoing argument has sought to develop a process of
international equivalence in the contributions which the deepsea
mining industries of nations participating in reciprocal or treaty
regimes may make towards the social costs their activities incur, but
would not otherwise meet.

